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Abstract
While the Coase Theorem has been a touchstone for understanding bargaining behavior, it
has also been criticized for relying on unrealistic assumptions. In response, a line of
experimental research analyzes bargaining behavior in laboratory settings. This paper uses
meta-analysis to evaluate the Coasean bargaining literature by modeling the probability of an
efficient bargain as a function of: (1) measures of transaction costs and related variables, and
(2) measures of the social dimensions of a bargain. Results suggest that efficient solutions are
more likely when explicit transaction costs do not exist, in the absence of a binding time
limit, and when participants have perfect information on payoff schedules. Social dimension
variables are found to have the potential to affect bargaining outcomes and are an important
avenue for further research.
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1. Introduction 
When the assumptions of the Coase Theorem are relaxed to more accurately 
reflect real world transaction costs, the robustness of the predicted behavior from the 
Coase Theorem is unclear. Addressing this issue, a line of research has developed that 
analyzes the predictions of the Coase Theorem in experimental settings. This paper uses 
statistical meta-analysis to investigate the Coasean bargaining literature to identify 
patterns and open research questions. Using 2,052 observations from 16 experimental 
studies, we identify characteristics of study design that have a statistically significant 
impact on the probability that the predicted behavior of the Coase Theorem is supported 
by laboratory evidence. Two broad classifications of regressors are used: measures 
related to transaction costs and measures of the social dimensions of a bargain.    
Econometric results from the meta-analysis indicate that the literature has made 
clear progress in evaluating the impact of transaction costs on efficiency (e.g., presence 
of penalties invoked with each offer or binding time limits). Variables that describe the 
social dimensions of a bargain (e.g., channels of communication, property right allocation 
process, and whether bargainers repeat rounds with the same partner) are also found to 
have the potential to significantly impact the likelihood that the predicted behavior of the 
Coase Theorem is supported by laboratory behavior. This finding is important in two 
ways. 
First, across disciplines, the importance of social context and social capital 
(relationships and norms characterizing a community) are increasingly recognized (Pretty 
and Ward 2001) and tied to a variety of policy proposals (e.g., environmental applications 
in water and forest management, fisheries, habitat preservation, etc). The evidence here is 
supportive of a role for policy in actively attempting to develop social connections among 
bargainers.  
Second, this result illuminates the need for a shift in relative focus in future 
Coasean bargaining research. Whereas the impact of transaction costs has been a 
common focal point in the literature, the impact of social dimensions has received 
considerably less attention. However, despite this relative emphasis, this meta-analysis 
shows that social dimensions also have the potential to influence bargaining behavior. 
Thus, our analysis suggests that study of how social dimensions impact Coasean 
bargaining behavior warrants attention and is an important avenue for future research.  
 
2. Motivation 
 The Coase Theorem predicts that given clearly defined and transferable property 
rights, agents facing an externality will negotiate to an efficient solution, provided a 
number of assumptions are met (Coase 1960). Further, the Coase Theorem argues that the 
same Pareto efficient solution will occur irrespective of the initial property right 
allocation (Coase 1960). The Coase Theorem relies on the logic that in the absence of 
transaction costs, mutually beneficial trades will ensure that property rights are allocated 
to their highest value. The idea is powerful, and regulatory policy across a range of 
applications (e.g., tradable pollution permits, transferable rights to water usage) makes 
use of this logic. 
The Coase Theorem is vulnerable to the critique that it depends upon restrictive, 
unrealistic assumptions. It is recognized widely, notably by Coase himself, that such 
assumptions are often inconsistent with real world externalities (Coase 1991; Usher 
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1998). Therefore, determining whether the predictions of the Coase Theorem can be 
extended to situations where transaction costs exist has been the central motivation of this 
line of experimental research as well as a focus here.  
Providing additional motivation though is the trend in experimental economics of 
context affecting behavior in laboratory settings (Leavitt and List 2007; Messer et al. 
2007). Choices in laboratory settings are increasingly thought to be influenced not only 
by pecuniary implications, but also by the social dimensions characterizing the setting. 
However, the Coasean bargaining literature has been characterized by a relative paucity 
of analyses specifically focused on social dimensions (Shogren 1989 is a notable 
exception). It is therefore an important and unanswered question as to whether the 
Coasean bargaining literature is consistent with the broader finding of social dimensions 
influencing behavior. 
 
3. Coasean Bargaining Experiments 
The majority of a growing number of Coasean bargaining studies follow 
something similar to the experimental design first used by Hoffman and Spitzer (1982). 
This design is described as follows. 
Participants are segmented into bargaining dyads and provided a payoff schedule 
describing approximately five payoff options. Each payoff option describes the monetary 
payoff that both participants will receive. An example payoff schedule is presented in 
Table 1. A property right regime is implemented, where most often one of the players is 
assigned the right of Controller. The Controller may unilaterally decide which payoff 
option will be selected and in doing so selects the payoff both players receive. The player 
that does not have the property right, the Non-Controller, may attempt to convince the 
Controller to select a more favorable payoff option by offering a side payment. One of 
the payoff options, option 4 in Table 1, represents the payoff option where the 
participants receive the maximum possible joint profit. This payoff option is the potential 
Pareto efficient outcome.
1 Inference is drawn from whether bargaining pairs successfully 
negotiate to the efficient outcome and in doing so maximize their joint payoff. Coasean 
bargaining games are thus connected to the Coase Theorem in that the dominant payoff 
option for the Controller is often not the potential Pareto efficient solution and the 
efficient solution will only be reached if a side payment is negotiated.  
Though the basic framework and design used is similar, the type and 
implementation of transaction costs in various experimental designs distinguish Coasean 
experiments from one another. Coasean bargaining experiments have analyzed the effect 
of a broad range of possible hindrances to efficiency. Examples include: having more 
than two parties associated with a bargain (Hoffman and Spitzer 1986), introducing 
explicit transaction costs that reduce a participant’s payoffs as time or offers increase 
(Shogren 1998), not enforcing agreements with certainty (Cherry and Shogren 2005), and 
limiting the channels of communication (Prudencio 1982).  
Consensus on the impact of transaction costs in bargaining behavior remains 
somewhat elusive. While the literature provides ample evidence that the predicted 
behavior of the Coase Theorem holds up in the presence of transaction costs (e.g., 
                                                 
1Hereafter, “efficiency”, “efficient solution”, or “efficient outcome” refer to the payoff 
option where the sum of both participants payoffs is maximized. 
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Hoffman and Spitzer 1986; Shogren et al. 2003), some studies reach the opposite 
conclusion, (e.g., Rhoads and Shogren 2003), or find mixed evidence (Shogren 1998; 
Rhoads and Shogren 1999).  
 
4. Modeling Strategy 
Meta-analysis has emerged as a helpful tool for making inferences from a 
collection of empirical work (Stanley 2001). Similar in spirit to a literature review, meta-
analysis uses statistical modeling to summarize the results from a line of research. In 
conventional meta-analysis, a summary statistic is drawn from each included study and 
regressed on moderator variables characterizing each study.  
Though the objective is to remove some of the subjectivity inherent to narrative 
literature review, meta-analysis cannot sidestep all author bias. For example, because 
many bilateral bargaining experiments exist that make use of an experimental design 
similar to that described above, deciding what studies to include is a particularly 
important choice here. We use three criteria in deciding which studies to include. First, a 
study must show a clear focus on analyzing the Coase Theorem. Second, a study must 
meet our data requirement by providing the information to construct our summary 
statistic: whether or not a dyad negotiates to an efficient outcome. Finally, studies were 
gathered from economics databases (e.g., EconLit, JSTOR) and Google Scholar and are 
therefore limited to published works.  
The variable EFFICIENT is a constructed dummy variable, coded as 1 if a dyad 
negotiates to the efficient outcome and 0 otherwise. A limitation of our summary variable 
EFFICIENT is that it is a binary measure and as a result, does not provide the richness of 
continuous measures of bargaining success. In later Coasean bargaining experiments, a 
continuous variable, often called reward efficiency, provides a more detailed description 
of bargaining success by measuring the joint payoff bargainers receive divided by the 
maximum possible joint payoff (e.g., Rhoads and Shogren 1999; Shogren et al. 2002; 
Rhoads and Shogren 2003). However, a majority of the extant Coasean bargaining 
studies do not report reward efficiency and we therefore must rely on the binary measure 
EFFICIENT as our dependent variable (only 39% of observations and seven studies used 
here report reward efficiency). 
The probability of a negotiation resulting in efficiency is modeled using the probit 
probability model. From the experimental literature, we extract eight moderator variables 
that capture differences in experimental design. The data set consists of 2,052 bargains 
that take place across the 16 studies (Our data is available by request or at 
http://www.unm.edu/~jthacher/ ). The eight moderator variables are best considered as 
belonging to one of two categories: a set of variables measuring the transaction costs 
associated with an experimental design, and a group of variables measuring some aspect 
of the social dimensions of a design.  
Because multiple observations are drawn from each individual paper, a primary 
concern in modeling is that the error terms from observations from the same study are not 
independent. In response, one commonly used econometric practice is to “correct” the 
error terms and allow for clustering. In a first set of models, we follow this convention by 
estimating with robust standard errors, clustered by the paper an observation is drawn 
from. Doing so removes the assumption of independence of observations that are from 
the same paper, grouping and summing error terms, by paper in this case, to calculate the 
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sample variance (Rogers 1993). The variance estimator for this set of models is (Scribney 
2007): 
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and  nc  is the number of clusters and  ei  is the residual from the ith observation.  
Alternatively, panel modeling is another commonly used approach in meta-
analysis. The advantage of this approach over the robust standard errors model is that 
both the parameter estimates and the standard errors reflect the underlying clustering. For 
this reason, we place greater emphasis on the results from the panel models than from the 
robust standard error models. We begin the panel modeling process by stratifying the data 
by the paper an observation is drawn from. The decision of whether to use models with 
paper-specific constants (i.e. fixed effects models) or paper specific-error terms (i.e. 
random effects models) is swayed by several characteristics of the data. On several 
counts, fixed effects modeling would be problematic. For one, our independent variables 
in some cases are characterized by little intra-panel variation, implying that including 
panel-specific constants dilutes the explanatory power of these variables. Secondly, 
adding paper-specific constants is costly in terms of degrees of freedom. Finally, fixed 
effects probit estimators are subject to the incidental parameters problem and therefore 
yield potentially inconsistent estimates. Therefore, modeling with paper-specific error 
terms and not paper-specific constants is a preferable option. Thus, we also present a 
second set of random effects probit models. 
 
5. Data 
Table 2 provides variable definitions and summary statistics. Across the entire 
data set (2052 observations), 69 percent of the experiments resulted in an efficient 
outcome. Beginning with the group of variables including transaction costs and related 
measures, the literature shows considerable variation in implementation. In some 
instances, transaction costs have been incorporated explicitly into the structure of a 
bargaining game (Shogren 1998). For example, the payoff that participants can 
potentially earn may decrease as the number of offers exchanged between a dyad 
increases (Cherry and Shogren 2005). Explicit transaction costs have also reduced the 
payoff amount that a dyad can potentially earn as time elapses (Shogren 1998). The effect 
of these types of transaction costs is measured with the dummy variable PENALTIES 
(coded as 1 for transaction costs that explicitly reduce potential payoffs, and 0 
otherwise).
2  
                                                 
2 Some bargains that included PENALTIES are also coded as EFFICIENT. In these 
studies, bargainers negotiate over lottery tickets. Transaction costs here reduce the payoff 
to the winner of the lottery but do not affect the number of lottery tickets the dyad can 
potentially obtain. Dyads that obtain the maximum possible amount of lottery tickets are 
deemed EFFICIENT, irrespective of incurred penalties.   
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Though not as overt as the above mentioned transaction costs (PENALTIES), a 
series of other design elements nonetheless also represent potential barriers to efficiency. 
For example, a commonly used design element is to set a time limit for the bargaining 
period. We create the variable TIME, coded as 1 where a bargain is subject to a time limit 
and 0 otherwise. Paralleling the real world costs that are associated with legal systems in 
which bargains are not upheld with certainty, a group of our observations are taken from 
studies where negotiated side payments are not always enforced (Rhoads and Shogren 
2003). The variable UNCERTAINTY is coded as 1 where bargains are not upheld with 
certainty and 0 otherwise. Finally, a subset of Coasean bargaining experiments do not 
assign a unilateral property right to an individual but rather require consensus among 
players (Hoffman and Spitzer 1986).
3 The variable SINGLE is a dummy coded as 1 when 
a single player has a unilateral property right and 0 otherwise. The variables in this first 
group are linked in that each is intended to capture the effect of a transaction cost 
associated with alternative institutional frameworks.  
In contrast, the second group of variables measure social elements that can 
potentially influence the success of a bargain. The constructed social dimension variables 
are usually not the focus of the experiment (e.g., for hypothesis testing) but instead are 
simply characteristics of experimental design that vary across author and analytical 
approach as methodological contributions from related literatures have been incorporated. 
One design element with substantial variation is the channel of communication through 
which negotiating takes place. Examples from the literature include: face-to-face 
bargaining (e.g., Hoffman and Spitzer 1982), written negotiations passed through an 
intermediary (Prudencio 1982), and negotiating via networked PCs (King 1994). A 
dummy variable is created, FACE-TO-FACE, coded as 1 where negotiations take place 
face to face, and 0 otherwise.  
In addition, by placing the payoff a participant receives in context with the payoff 
of their bargaining partner, the information participants receive describing the payoff 
schedule can also be thought of as one element of the social dimension of a negotiation 
(e.g., Hoffman and Spitzer 1986). We use the distinction between treatments in which 
bargainers are fully aware of their opponent’s payoff schedule and experiments where 
bargainers know only their own payoff information to create the variable FULL-INFO. 
This is a dummy variable coded as 1 where bargainers are aware of their opponent’s 
payoff schedule in addition to their own and 0 otherwise.  
It has long been thought that the mechanism used to allocate the property right 
can impact bargaining behavior (Hoffman and Spitzer 1986). Participants have been 
observed in some instances negotiating with less emphasis on self interest and more 
emphasis on achieving a “fair” outcome when the property right is assigned randomly 
(Hoffman and Spitzer 1986; Shogren 1989). In response, some experiments have had 
participants play a game to determine the property right, hypothesizing that when the 
property right is “earned”, participants are more likely to display self-interested behavior. 
The dummy variable, GAME, is constructed to describe the process by which the 
                                                 
3Hoffman and Spitzer (1986) describe this property right regime as having joint 
controllers where participants do not negotiate singularly but rather are separated into two 
teams. Unanimity among all team members is required. Each team member can veto the 
decision to accept a side payment in exchange for accepting a specific payoff option.  
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property right is allocated (coded 1 if the property right is decided by game play and 0 
otherwise). The final design aspect we consider is whether participants engage in 
repeated bargains with the same partner. Potential reputation effects exist when 
bargaining dyads repeatedly negotiate with the same partner and are thought to have the 
potential to influence bargaining behavior.  Thus, the variable REPEAT-BARGAIN is 
coded as 1 where participants bargain with the same partner over consecutive bargains 
and 0 otherwise. 
 
6. Results 
  Econometric results are presented in Table 3. Three different model specifications 
are presented (Models 1, 2 and 3), each using both random effects and robust standard 
errors approaches. Wald χ
2 statistics are significant for each model, meaning that the 
presented models fit the data significantly better than a model which only includes an 
intercept term.  
Results are unambiguous with respect to the effect of measures relating to 
transaction costs. Across all specifications and both modeling approaches, the estimated 
coefficients for the variables PENALTIES and TIME are statistically significant and 
negative. Therefore, the results suggest that the probability of a bargain resulting in 
efficiency is diminished when explicit transaction costs are invoked or a bargain is 
subject to a time constraint. Presented in Table 3, the marginal effects for these variables 
(and the subsequently discussed variables) show the change in probability of a 
negotiation resulting in efficiency as the regressor of interest changes from 0 to 1. While 
the reported marginal effects vary slightly by specification and modeling approach, the 
impact of these variables on the probability that a negotiation results in efficiency is 
considerable. The marginal effects for the random effects probit in Model 3 for 
PENALTIES and TIME are -17% and -26%, respectively. In other words, for the average 
experiment, imposing a time limit has the largest impact on efficiency, decreasing the 
likelihood of an efficient outcome by 26%.  
Indicated by estimated coefficients that are never statistically different from zero, 
the two other variables in this category, UNCERTAINTY and SINGLE, do not appear to 
influence the probability of a bargain reaching efficiency. Thus, the type and manner of 
implementation of transaction costs appears important. The results from this set of 
variables are insensitive to both modeling approach and specification. Viewed as a whole, 
the evidence with respect to the group of variables measuring transaction costs tells a 
clear and not surprising story: increases in measures related to transaction costs can 
reduce the probability of efficiency.   
The social dimensions of a bargain also have an important impact on whether the 
end outcome of a negotiation is efficient. The overall results from the social capital 
variables are generally consistent with the models presented in Table 3: In all cases, the 
estimated coefficient on FULL-INFO is statistically significant and positive, the 
estimated coefficients for FACE-TO-FACE and REPEAT-BARGAIN are generally 
positive and significant, and negative and significant, respectively, and the estimated 
coefficient for GAME is not statistically different than zero. However, though consistent 
in sign, the statistical significance of the coefficients for these variables is sensitive to 
model specification. Variables are less likely to be significant in the robust standard error 
models. In the random effects specifications, REPEAT-BARGAIN becomes insignificant 
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when FACE-TO-FACE is included, suggesting some underlying correlation between the 
social dimension variables. Similar to the set of transaction cost variables, the estimated 
marginal effects for these variables are potentially large. For example, the random effects 
specification for Model 3 shows that face-to-face negotiation and providing full 
information in the average experiment increases the probability of an efficient outcome 
by 22% and 21%, respectively. Therefore, while the impact of transaction costs has 
received far more attention in the literature, the meta-analysis suggests social dimension 
variables can have just as large an impact on bargaining behavior.   
As noted earlier, sufficient data to use reward efficiency as our summary statistic 
does not exist. Nonetheless, it is possible that our results are affected by decision to use 
the binary variable EFFICIENT. As a test, alternative specifications were evaluated that 
include a dummy variable that categorized studies on the basis of whether they presented 
“reward efficiency.” Though significant and negative, this variable is highly correlated 
with several other variables included in the model (0.61 and -0.56 with PENALTIES and 
REPEAT-BARGAIN, respectively) and concern over multicollinearity therefore prevents 
inclusion as a primary model. With respect to coefficient signs and significance, these 
models yielded results generally consistent with the models presented in Table 3.  
 
7. Discussion and Conclusion 
  The task undertaken in this paper is to examine the literature of Coasean 
bargaining experiments. Using meta-analysis, we statistically model the probability of a 
bargain resulting in efficiency as a function of contrasting experimental design elements. 
The body of Coasean bargaining experiments shows clear evidence of variables 
characterizing transaction costs reducing the likelihood of efficient bargains. More 
striking though is the finding that in some cases, variables characterizing social 
dimensions have a just as significant impact on bargaining behavior. 
This result is important in two ways. For one, this finding provides empirical 
support for arguments for developing social capital as a tool in settings like 
environmental management applications of Coasean bargaining. Across a range of such 
applications, policy is beginning to implement tools that aim to develop social capital 
(e.g., Pretty and Ward 2001), which may facilitate bargaining or collaborative behavior. 
More broadly though, the findings here also represent a weather vane for future 
Coasean bargaining experiments. Despite receiving relatively little specific focus in the 
literature, variables characterizing social dimensions have efficiency impacts that are of a 
similar magnitude to measures of transaction costs. Thus, the meta-analysis suggests a 
transition in the literature is warranted. Alongside the traditional focus on transaction 
costs, an increased focus on the impact of social dimensions emerges as an important 
avenue for future research.  
This finding is consistent with a broader trend in experimental economics 
recognizing the importance of context in experimental studies (Harrison and List 2004; 
Leavitt and List 2007). So while the meta-analysis clearly suggests social dimensions 
impact bargaining behavior, the specific manner of how emerges as an important avenue 
for future research. Combined with the unambiguous results from the transaction cost 
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Table 1. Example Coasean Bargaining Payoff Schedule 
Payoff Option  Payoff to Player A  Payoff to Player B 
1 10  50 
2 20  40 
3 30  30 
4 45  20 


































Table 2. Variable Descriptions and Summary Statistics (n=2052) 
Variable Description  Mean   
(sd) 
EFFICIENT  Dummy variable; coded as 1 if 
participants negotiate to the potential 






PENALTIES  Dummy variable, coded as 1 if bargainers 
face explicit transaction costs that reduce 
their potential payoff, 0 otherwise. 
0.28 
(0.45) 
TIME  Dummy variable; coded as 1 where 
bargainers face a time limit, 0 otherwise. 
0.73 
(0.45) 
UNCERTAINTY  Dummy variable; coded as 1 where 




SINGLE  Dummy variable; coded as 1 when a single 
player has a unilateral right property right, 






FULL-INFO  Dummy variable; coded as 1 where 
bargainers are aware of their opponent’s 




GAME  Dummy variable; coded as 1 when the 




REPEAT-BARGAIN Dummy  variable; coded as 1 if 
participants repeatedly bargain with the 




FACE-TO-FACE Dummy  variable; coded as 1 where 


















Table 3. Probit Regression Results (Dependent Variable = EFFICIENT) 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 




































































































































































N  2052 2052 2052 2052 2052 2052 
Wald χ
2  135.14*** 277.08*** 103.83*** 812.76*** 130.09*** 483.80*** 
Log-Likelihood -1027.69 -1051.78 -1028.49 -1046.47 -1026.96 -1044.75 
Notes: ***,  **,  and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, 
respectively (two-tailed t-tests). Marginal effects are presented in brackets, t-statistics in 
parentheses. Log-Likelihood scores presented for models estimated with robust standard 
errors are Pseudo Log-Likelihood scores.   